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
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 ... **Fujisaki-Okamoto**: If  $\epsilon_{pk}(M)$  is a one-way **encryption** scheme, the hybrid scheme  $\epsilon_{pkhy}(M) = \langle \epsilon_{pk}(\sigma; H_3(\sigma, M)), H_4(\sigma) \oplus M \rangle$  is secure in the Semantic Security ...  
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 dabo@cs.stanford.edu franklin@cs.ucdavis.edu Appears in SIAM J. of Computing ...  
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... Joonsang Baek, Byoungcheon Lee, and Kwangjo Kim, "Secure Length-saving ElGamal Encryption under the **Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption**", Proc. ...  
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oh ` { 5 | Jv □ ) £ □ v ¢ " **FO-1** !; Jv □□ ) **EIGamal** ! ...info.isl.ntt.co.jp/psec/CRYPTREC/2001/00jspec.pdf - [Similar pages](#)**[PS] OHSU/OGI**File Format: Adobe PostScript - [View as Text](#)... lo oks. even. wo rse. than. D LP. . 21. Securit y of. **EIGamal**. Signatures. (ctd).ffl Existential. **fo** rgery. - Cho. ose fi ; fl. ,. then. face DLP. **fo** rx. - Still ...www.cse.ogi.edu/class/cse528/seven4.ps - [Similar pages](#)**[PS] A General Construction of IND-CCA2 Secure**File Format: Adobe PostScript - [View as Text](#)... of the BKL-scheme is made with El Gamal encryption once the **FO**-transform has ... 14.T. **EIGamal**, A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete ...intern.lmi.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ kiltz/papers/general\_cca2.ps - [Similar pages](#)**[PS] Lecture 29: Elliptic Curve Cryptography**File Format: Adobe PostScript - [View as Text](#)... Z=7Z. We have. E(Z=7Z) = **fo**; (2; 2); (0; 1); (0; 6); (2; 5)g; 2. ... 3 **EIGamal** How

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
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... 8, EE, Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David **Pointcheval**, Phillip Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key **Encryption Schemes**. CRYPTO 1998: 26-45 ...  
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**1 Efficient revocation and threshold pairing based cryptosystems**

Benoît Libert, Jean-Jacques Quisquater

July 2003 **Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing**Full text available: [pdf\(1.02 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

Boneh, Ding, Tsudik and Wong recently proposed a way for obtaining fast revocation of RSA keys. Their method consists in using security mediators that keep a piece of each user's private key in such a way that every decryption or signature operation requires the help of the mediator for the user. Revocation is achieved by instructing the mediator to stop helping the user to sign or decrypt messages. This security architecture, called SEM, gave rise to an identity based mediated RSA scheme (IB-mRS ...)

**Keywords:** Public key cryptosystems, bilinear maps, revocation

**2 Attack and evaluation: Overcoming the obstacles of zero-knowledge watermark detection**

André Adelsbach, Markus Rohe, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

September 2004 **Proceedings of the 2004 multimedia and security workshop on Multimedia and security**Full text available: [pdf\(236.53 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

Standard watermarking schemes suffer from a major problem: They require to reveal security critical information to potentially untrusted parties, when proving the presence of a watermark to these parties. Zero-knowledge watermark detection is a promising means to overcome this problem and to improve the security of digital watermarking schemes in the context of various applications: it allows to cryptographically conceal the information required for the detection of a watermark and to prove the ...

**Keywords:** interactive generation of commitments on Gaussian distributed samples, statistical tests on committed numbers, zero-knowledge protocols, zero-knowledge watermark detection

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Martín Abadi, Neal Glew

May 2002 **Proceedings of the eleventh international conference on World Wide Web**Full text available:  pdf(189.19 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

This paper presents a new protocol for certified email. The protocol aims to combine security, scalability, easy implementation, and viable deployment. The protocol relies on a light on-line trusted third party; it can be implemented without any special software for the receiver beyond a standard email reader and web browser, and does not require any public-key infrastructure.

**22 Password Management and Digital Signatures: Delegation of cryptographic servers for capture-resilient devices**

Philip MacKenzie, Michael K. Reiter

November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**Full text available:  pdf(312.90 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

A device that performs private key operations (signatures or decryptions), and whose private key operations are protected by a password, can be immunized against offline dictionary attacks in case of capture by forcing the device to confirm a password guess with a designated remote server in order to perform a private key operation. Recent proposals for achieving this allow untrusted servers and require no server initialization per device. In this paper we extend these proposals to enable dynami ...

**23 Group Key Management and Signatures: Accountable-subgroup multisignatures: extended abstract**

Silvio Micali, Kazuo Ohta, Leonid Reyzin

November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**Full text available:  pdf(306.24 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

Formal models and security proofs are especially important for multisignatures: in contrast to threshold signatures, no precise definitions were ever provided for such schemes, and some proposals were subsequently broken. In this paper, we formalize and implement a variant of multi-signature schemes, *Accountable-Subgroup Multisignatures (ASM)*. In essence, ASM schemes enable any subgroup,  $S$ , of a given group,  $G$ , of potential signers, to sign efficiently a message  $M$  so t ...

**Keywords:** digital signature, multisignature

#### 24 Cryptosystems: Paillier's cryptosystem revisited

Dario Catalano, Rosario Gennaro, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Phong Q. Nguyen  
 November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**

Full text available: [pdf\(1.55 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

We re-examine Paillier's cryptosystem, and show that by choosing a particular discrete log base  $g$ , and by introducing an alternative decryption procedure, we can extend the scheme to allow an arbitrary exponent  $e$  instead of  $N$ . The use of low exponents substantially increases the efficiency of the scheme. The semantic security is now based on a new *decisional* assumption, namely the hardness of deciding whether an element is a "small"  $e$ -th residue modulo  $N$  ...

#### 25 Password Management and Digital Signatures: Twin signatures: an alternative to the hash-and-sign paradigm

David Naccache, David Pointcheval, Jacques Stern  
 November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**

Full text available: [pdf\(402.64 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

This paper introduces a simple alternative to the hash-and-sign paradigm, from the security point of view but for signing short messages, called *twinning*. A twin signature is obtained by signing twice a short message by a signature scheme. Analysis of the concept in different settings yields the following results:

- We prove that no generic algorithm can efficiently forge a twin DSA signature. Although generic algorithms offer a less stringent form of security than computational red ...

**Keywords:** digital signatures, discrete logarithm, flexible RSA problem, generic model, provable security, standard model

#### 26 Cryptosystems: OCB: a block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption

Phillip Rogaway, Mihir Bellare, John Black, Ted Krovetz  
 November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**

Full text available: [pdf\(285.44 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

We describe a parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encrypts-and-authenticates a nonempty string  $M$  &egrave;  $\{0,1\}^*$  using  $\lceil \log_2 |M| \rceil + 2$  block-cipher invocations, where  $n$  is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional overhead is small. OCB refines a scheme, IAPM, suggested by Charanjit Jutla. Desirable properties of OCB include: the ability to encrypt a bit string of arbitrary length into a ...

**Keywords:** AES, authenticity, block ciphers, cryptography, encryption, integrity, modes of operation, provable security, standards

#### 27 Cryptosystems: Securely combining public-key cryptosystems

Stuart Haber, Benny Pinkas  
 November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**

Full text available: [pdf\(416.51 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

It is a maxim of sound computer-security practice that a cryptographic key should have only a single use. For example, an RSA key pair should be used only for public-key encryption or only for digital signatures, and not for both. In this paper we show that in many cases, the simultaneous use of related keys for two cryptosystems, e.g. for a public-key encryption system and for a public-key signature system, does not compromise their security. We demonstrate this for a variety of public-key encry ...

## **28 Group Key Management and Signatures: Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange**

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval, Jean-Jacques Quisquater  
 November 2001 **Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security**

Full text available:  [pdf\(578.14 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal ...

## **29 Practical multi-candidate election system**

Olivier Baudron, Pierre-Alain Fouque, David Pointcheval, Jacques Stern, Guillaume Poupard  
 August 2001 **Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing**

Full text available:  [pdf\(898.50 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

The aim of electronic voting schemes is to provide a set of protocols that allow voters to cast ballots while a group of authorities collect the votes and output the final tally. In this paper we describe a practical multi-candidate election scheme that guarantees privacy of voters, public verifiability, and robustness against a coalition of malicious authorities. Furthermore, we address the problem of receipt-freeness and incoercibility of voters. Our new scheme is based on the Paillier cryp ...

## **30 Fair electronic cash withdrawal and change return for wireless networks**

Robert Tracz, Konrad Wrona  
 July 2001 **Proceedings of the 1st international workshop on Mobile commerce**

Full text available:  [pdf\(460.27 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

We propose a practical mobile electronic cash system that combines macro and micropayment mechanisms and offers very high security and user's privacy protection. Notably, we have developed an innovative fair withdrawal and change return protocols, which are efficient and preclude any fraudulent misbehaviors, while user anonymity and transaction unlinkability are preserved. Coins are withdrawn if, and only if payer's account is debited. Change is returned to an anonymous payer, who gets it alw ...

**Keywords:** electronic commerce, payment systems, wireless applications

## **31 Secure password-based cipher suite for TLS**

May 2001 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 4 Issue 2

Full text available:  [pdf\(507.57 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#), [review](#)

SSL is the de facto standard today for securing end-to-end transport on the Internet. While the protocol itself seems rather secure, there are a number of risks that lurk in its use, for example, in web banking. However, the adoption of password-based key-exchange protocols can overcome some of these problems. We propose the integration of such a

protocol (DH-EKE) in the TLS protocol, the standardization of SSL by IETF. The resulting protocol provides secure mutual authentication and key establi ...

**Keywords:** Authenticated key exchange, dictionary attack, key agreement, password, perfect forward secrecy, secure channel, transport layer security, weak secret

### 32 Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems

Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner

November 2000 **Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**

Full text available: [pdf\(542.46 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

**Keywords:** cryptography, simulability

### 33 Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption

Ronald Cramer, Victor Shoup

August 2000 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 3 Issue 3

Full text available: [pdf\(168.52 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#), [review](#)

We describe and analyze a new digital signature scheme. The new scheme is quite efficient, does not require the signer to maintain any state, and can be proven secure against adaptive chosen message attack under a reasonable intractability assumption, the so-called strong RSA assumption. Moreover, a hash function can be incorporated into the scheme in such a way that it is also secure in the random oracle model under the standard RSA assumption.

**Keywords:** RSA, digital signatures, provable security

### 34 Efficient verifiable encryption (and fair exchange) of digital signatures

Giuseppe Ateniese

November 1999 **Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**

Full text available: [pdf\(781.40 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

A fair exchange protocol allows two users to exchange items so that either each user gets the other's item or neither user does. In [2], verifiable encryption is introduced as a primitive that can be used to build extremely efficient fair exchange protocols where the items exchanged represent digital signatures. Such protocols may be used to digitally sign contracts. This paper presents new simple schemes for verifiable encryption of digital signatures. We make us ...

**Keywords:** contract signing problem, digital signatures, fair exchange, proof of knowledge, public-key cryptography, verifiable encryption

### 35 Public-key cryptography and password protocols: the multi-user case

Maurizio Kliban Boyarsky

November 1999 **Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**

Full text available: [pdf\(1.00 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

The problem of password authentication over an insecure network when the user holds only

a human-memorizable password has received much attention in the literature. The first rigorous treatment was provided by Halevi and Krawczyk, who studied off-line password guessing attacks in the scenario in which the authentication server possesses a pair of private and public keys. In this work we: Show the inadequacy of both the HK formalization and protocol in the ...

### **36 Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design**

Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas, Reuban Sumner

November 1999 **Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce**

Full text available: [pdf\(278.36 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

### **37 Unlinkable serial transactions: protocols and applications**

Stuart G. Stubblebine, Paul F. Syverson, David M. Goldschlag

November 1999 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 2 Issue 4

Full text available: [pdf\(184.87 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#), [review](#)

We present a protocol for unlinkable serial transactions suitable for a variety of network-based subscription services. It is the first protocol to use cryptographic blinding to enable subscription services. The protocol prevents the service from tracking the behavior of its customers, while protecting the service vendor from abuse due to simultaneous or cloned use by a single subscriber. Our basic protocol structure and recovery protocol are robust against failure in protocol termination. ...

**Keywords:** anonymity, blinding, cryptographic protocols, unlinkable serial transactions

### **38 On the fly signatures based on factoring**

Guillaume Poupard, Jacques Stern

November 1999 **Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**

Full text available: [pdf\(786.71 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

In response to the current need for fast, secure and cheap public-key cryptography largely induced by the fast development of electronic commerce, we propose a new on the fly signature scheme, i.e. a scheme that requires very small on-line work for the signer. It combines provable security based on the factorization problem, short public and secret keys, short transmission and minimal on-line computation. It is the first RSA-like signature scheme that can be used for both ef ...

### **39 Public-key cryptography and password protocols**

Shai Halevi, Hugo Krawczyk

August 1999 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 2 Issue 3

Full text available: [pdf\(275.84 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#), [review](#)

We study protocols for strong authentication and key exchange in asymmetric scenarios where the authentication server possesses ~a pair of private and public keys while the client has only a weak human-memorizable password as its authentication key. We present and analyze several simple password authentication protocols in this scenario, and show that the security of these protocols can be formally proven based on standard cryptographic assumptions. Remarkably, our analysis shows optimal re ...

**Keywords:** dictionary attacks, hand-held certificates, key exchange, passwords, public passwords, public-key protocols

**40 Complete characterization of security notions for probabilistic private-key encryption**

Jonathan Katz, Moti Yung

May 1999 **Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing**Full text available: [pdf\(973.62 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

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**41 A new public key cryptosystem based on higher residues**

David Naccache, Jacques Stern

November 1998 **Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**Full text available: [pdf\(1.00 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)**42 Public-key cryptography and password protocols**

Shai Halevi, Hugo Krawczyk

November 1998 **Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**Full text available: [pdf\(1.28 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)**43 The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)**

Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, Shai Halevi

May 1998 **Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing**Full text available: [pdf\(1.44 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)**44 New blind signatures equivalent to factorization (extended abstract)**

David Pointcheval, Jacques Stern

April 1997 **Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security**Full text available: [pdf\(776.77 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

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